Horace N. Allen: Missions, Expansionism, Structural Holes, and Social Capital

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Abstract

To date, only two scholars (historians) have attempted to research thoroughly the Horace N. Allen Manuscripts (MSS) regarding the first American resident missionary in Korea. This paper makes an important contribution because, to my knowledge, no study has perused the entire Allen MSS and woven a single theme that connects Allen’s actions in both Korea and Hawaii. Research on the development of Protestantism in Korea can be generally separated via religious and non-religious factors. In this paper, I emphasize how socio-historic contexts, expansionism, and various missionary activities allowed Allen to fill structural holes and employ social capital for personal and national advancements. I argue that Allen’s social connections facilitated America’s missionary and expansionistic endeavors in Korea and Hawaii at the turn of the 20th century.

There is no shortage of scholarship regarding Horace N. Allen (1858-1923) and the burgeoning of Protestantism in Korea at the turn of the twentieth century. Some missionaries (e.g., Appenzeller, 1905; Hulbert, 1969 [1909]; Zwemer & Brown, 1908; Underwood, 1908; Brown, 1919; Clark, 1921 and 1930; Hall, 1978) who were in Korea during the same time frame as Allen over-emphasized the religious factors in explaining the growth of Protestantism. These works focused on the evangelistic nature of the missionaries’ work; Protestant growth was a spiritual enterprise. In contrast, other scholars (Namkung, 1928, p. 8; Deuchler, 1977; Hunt, Jr., 1980, p. 3; Carter et al., 1990, p. 249; Lee, 2001) have employed non-religious heuristics whereby Protestantism served as a boundary marker against China and Japan and became associated with progress and hope (Westernization).

Though some socio-historic (ethno-religious) studies have entailed the development of Protestantism at the turn of the twentieth century, the research was done without investigating the Allen Papers (MSS). For example, Young-Shin Park (2000, p. 507) associated Protestant developments with modernization and reactive ethnicity whereby Protestantism served as an anti-Japanese marker. Danielle Kane and Jung Mee Park (2009, pp. 366 and 368) employed a comparative analysis regarding “the puzzle of Christian success in Korea” and found a solution via geopolitical theory. Geopolitical theory was used as a heuristic and intersected with the concept of networks to explain why Protestantism grew in Korea but not in Japan or China. Andrew Kim (2000, p. 129) claimed “the dramatic growth of Protestantism in South Korea during
the 1960s, 70s, and 80s was due in part to the way certain doctrines and practices of the imported faith agreed with those of the folk tradition.” Whether one agrees with his premise that American Protestants at the turn of the 20th century had doctrines that were readily compatible with Korea’s indigenous religious beliefs may be a theological matter. Further, the contexts of reception and growth for Protestantism were not under the same conditions; there is a difference of one hundred years from 1880 to 1980. I have delimited this paper with a socio-historic analysis (primarily) on the Allen MSS.

There is a huge gap in the literature regarding Horace N. Allen, who claimed that as a medical doctor he opened “the mission work in Korea” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Rev. Josiah Strong D. D., August 30, 1888). No scholar questions that he was the first American Protestant resident missionary in Korea. Yet, depending on the source, he has been depicted as a medical missionary, a diplomat (proponent of American business), or both. According to the Yonsei University website (http://www.yonsei.ac.kr/eng/about/history/-chronicle/), Allen was crucial regarding “not only the birth of Yonsei University, but also the starting point of modern medical education in Korea and among the first in Asia.” Yonsei University has become one of the elite medical universities in South Korea. Allen’s tenure in Korea entailed going from China to Korea in 1884; leaving the mission field to become a court doctor and “unofficial” advisor to the Korean government and going to the U.S. with a Korean delegation in 1887; returning to Korea in 1890 as a missionary and “almost immediately” becoming the Secretary of the American Legation; becoming the U.S. Minister in 1897; and being recalled in 1905 (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, n.d.).

It appears that only two scholars (historians) have mined the Allen MSS in depth. Fred Harrington (1980) has done the best work regarding Allen and concessions in Korea. Wayne Patterson (1988; 2000; 2003) is the most significant scholar regarding Allen and Korean laborers in Hawaii. Although both Harrington and Patterson provided the only extensive treatment of the Allen MSS, they seemed to depict two different Horace Allens; one who was involved in Korea and one who was involved in Hawaii. What I show in this paper is that America’s interests in both expansionism and missions provided Allen the opportunities to be involved in Korea and Hawaii; under conditions of either expansionism or missions, Allen would not have had the same efficacy regarding concessions, the development of Christianity, and the illegal transfer of Korean laborers to Hawaii. I employ a socio-historic analysis by engaging primarily with the Allen MSS. I will argue that Allen was in a particular context of U.S. missions and expansionism, that he filled a structural hole (Allen became a nexus between various interests in the U.S., Korea, and Hawaii), and employed social capital for personal and national advancements.

A Brief Overview of Structural Holes and Social Capital

According to Ronald Burt (1997, p. 339), a person who can connect a structural hole, “disconnections between nonredundant contacts in a network,” will increase in importance the less people there are that can bridge a disconnection. Further, a person who can do this by virtue of his or her position in a network has social capital (Burt, 2004, p. 351). Broadly speaking, social
capital is the “fungibility” of human relationships for some type of advantage (Portes, 1988, p. 4; Small, 2009, pp. 3-21). Social capital can become an asset that exists “in the structure of relations between actors and among actors” (Coleman, 1988, p. S98). I argue that Allen became a broker (node) to connect otherwise unconnected actors (Small, 2009, p. 19). However, social capital can be bifurcated regarding its function; it can be an asset (via stockpiling) or a liability (negative social capital) (Small, 2009, pp. 128 and 18; Watts, 2003). It is through a lens of structural holes and social capital that I analyze Allen’s actions in Korea.

**Allen’s First Years in Korea: Building Social Capital**

After Allen’s request to move from China to Korea was approved by Dr. F. F. Ellinwood, the Secretary of the Foreign Board of Missions, Allen was appointed as the physician to the U.S. Legation on September 23, 1884 (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen’s Diary, September 23, 1884). A political fight ensued on December 4, 1884, during the inauguration of a new post office and Prince Min was injured (Allen, 1908, p. 68). Allen was appointed Court Physician and gained social capital with King Kojong of Korea after he tended to Prince Min (Allen, 1908, p. 70). Allen would be called a “brother” by the Prince, (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Ellinwood, February 4, 1885), rewarded with a “present of 100,000 cash” from the Prince, (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, January 27, 1885, Allen’s Diary), granted a gold mining concession for the American Trading Company, and offered another personal gift of $250 (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, September 11, 1886, Allen’s Diary). Further, the King allowed Allen “to proceed to Korea where missionaries were not allowed” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen’s Diary, n.d.) and he “arose rapidly to a position of great importance” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to G. P. Putnam’s sons, August 9, 1889). In 1886, Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, September 11, 1886, Allen’s Diary) claimed: “The King has consulted me on all matters and always takes my advice.” About a year after Min had recovered the King’s father held Allen’s hands during a private conversation as Allen was assured that “all Americans are good” and that Protestant missionaries would be safe in Korea (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, October 11, 1885, Allen’s Diary). This was significant because the King’s Father had been antagonistic towards Western missionaries and converts. Prior to the 1882 Treaty, “tens of thousands” of Koreans had been tortured and executed for having professed Christianity (McCune & Harrison, 1951, pp. 110-111). The King’s father, known as the Tai-Wen Kun, was behind these executions as he “hated Christianity” ([Index to the executive documents, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1884-1885, p. 336](https://history.wisc.edu/collections/1884-1885/)).

There is a certain irony in Allen’s stockpiling of social capital. Allen felt that he had played an inadvertent role in the Queen’s murder (1895). In 1893, Allen wrote to a friend that the King asked him “to induce American missionaries to live all around” his Palace because “he knows that we will protect our own people” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Gresham, marked “Confidential,” October 6, 1893). In the same letter, Allen admitted feeling responsible in allowing the Queen to let her guard down as he “had calmed her fears… by assuring her that with
Japanese army officials in charge of the city and the palace... there could certainly be no bodily harm inflicted upon the occupants of the palace.” However, he also claimed that her murder (by Japanese soldiers) led to his subsequent “assassination responsibilities” which then provided other opportunities: “I... made American influence paramount in Korea, and gave us the long thereafter enjoyed commercial advantage thus defeating the machinations of Japan, Germany and France, and forcing Russia and England to accede to and apparently approve of American success” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, n.d., emphasis mine). Allen would also serve as a node regarding American missions in Korea. Ellinwood consistently asked for Allen’s advice concerning future investments to build churches, hospitals, and schools (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Ellinwood to Allen, May 26, 1901). That Ellinwood asked for Allen’s advice was consistent with Allen’s influence regarding missionary endeavors in Korea. Allen was the nexus between American missionaries and the Korean government (King).

Allen’s relationship with George Nash connected him to William McKinley and David Deshler, Nash’s stepson (Patterson, 1988, pp. 27-8). Allen’s connection with Deshler would eventually have an impact on Korean emigrants to Hawaii. It would be Allan’s connection with McKinley and those who were close to McKinley that would give him the wherewithal to replace John Sill and become the U.S. Minister to Korea. Allen claimed that he “left the mission work” in 1887 under Governor McKinley’s advice to take “the Korean Embassy to Washington” because leaving a position in the Korean government would increase his chances of becoming the (next) U.S. Minister to Korea; Allen also had many conflicts with other missionaries and wished to terminate his “missionary” endeavors (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to J. S. Fassett, September 15, 1896). After Allen saw a letter that Deshler received from Nash, Allen assured Nash that he would try to help Deshler in the future (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Nash, April 24, 1897). Allen also sent a letter directly to McKinley in 1896 before the Presidential election that reminded McKinley of his advice to Allen to become Minister (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to William McKinley, September 19, 1896). Allen lobbied for the Minister position and was not shy in stating that he was “the most influential person in Korea” and that he alone could protect American interests (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to W. W. Rockhill, December 29, 1896).

The lobbying to fill a structural hole paid off. McKinley sent a personal letter endorsing Allen to the King (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to W. W. Rockhill, December 29, 1896). Based on the number of politicians and businessmen who corresponded with Allen, he became the U.S. Minister to Korea because of “America’s” collective interests (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923). Harrington (1980, p. 132) claimed that it was during the years 1887-1889 that Allen “made contacts with financiers” and “won the confidence of a few outstanding capitalists.” In 1889, Allen wrote to his brother-in-law that particular “New York Capitalists” and politicians were ready to “invest largely” in Korea (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Everett, February 23, 1889; cf. Allen to Dr. J. Darlington, November 8, 1889; Allen to A. Lybrand [House of Representatives], July 12, 1897; Allen to Frank G. Carpenter [Senator Foraker, and Secretary Sherman], May 8, 1897; Franklin Carpenter [Manager of Carpenter’s Newspaper Syndicate] to Allen, April 7, 1897; Allen to James

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H. Wilson, April 1, 1897). Allen had many supporters who wanted him to protect their “commercial” and “America’s interests” in Korea (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, e.g., C. E. James, of James & Co., Railway, Furnace, Mill and Mining Supplies to Clay Evans, Washington D.C. April 30, 1897). In fact, Allen explicitly told F. F. Ellinwood that he was backed by “some capitalists in N.Y.” so that “their interests will be honestly guarded” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Ellinwood, March 9, 1889).

**A Brief Overview of American Expansionism and Missions at the turn of the 20th Century**

Allen’s entrance into Korea did not occur in a vacuum but in a vortex of U.S. expansionism and missions; Korea was just one of numerous American mission fields (Ahn, 2009, p. 9). Various scholars have noted that the arrival of American Protestant missionaries coincided with political turmoil and the absence of other competing religions. H. Namkung (1928, p. 8) argued that Korea’s chaotic state in conjunction with governmental corruption pushed the Koreans for a better life and facilitated the reception of Christianity. Soo-il Chai (2003, p. 538) argued that American missions in Korea began with a conflation of commerce and religion and that the vestiges of this conflation can be evinced in Korean churches today (he uses mega-churches as an example). There was also an “international struggle” (external pressures) over Korea from the end of the 1880s to the first decade of the twentieth century (McCune & Harrison, 1951, p. 1). Korea was known as “The Treasure Land in the East” due to the abundance of “gold, silver, copper, iron, coal and other minerals” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, 1877).

Prior to Allen’s arrival America, China, Japan, and Germany had been making attempts to secure concessions in Korea (Harrington, 1980, p. 127). Shortly after the 1882 Treaty, England wanted China to remain in control of Korea because this allowed England to have access to China (and Korea) and prevented Russian dominance; Russia wanted control of Korea to maintain its hold on Eastern Siberia; and Japan needed Korea for “her continental expansion” and as “a shield against invasion” (McCune & Harrison, 1951, p. 2). In 1885, Allen noted that Korea’s three greatest foreign threats were China, Japan, and Russia (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Ellinwood, June 22, 1885). A well-known Korean newspaper for non-Western readers, *The Independent* (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, June 18, 1898), noted as late as 1898 that Korea was important internationally regarding “industrial and commercial matters.” The King and Queen of Korea concurred that Korea had to “modernize” and create political alliances (McCune & Harrison, 1951, p. 2).

George Foulk was sent to Korea in 1884 as an American naval attaché and was ordered by the State and Naval Departments to establish positive relations between Korea and the U.S. (Hawley, 2008, p. 2). However, Allen admitted that the U.S. had come to Korea “for profit” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Korea; Three articles on, 1905). The King began to ask America for help via military instructors in 1886 and sent a “Special Mission” to the United States in 1887 (McCune & Harrison, 1951, p. 125). This group, led by Allen, would visit particular industries and related
infrastructures to ascertain how America enacted a particular (capitalistic) means of production (McCune & Harrison, 1951, p. 11). As the first U.S. Minister to Korea, Lucius Foote stated that if he had “in any manner succeeded” it was in expansionism, “the sole purpose of extending the influence of my country and of opening new fields for her commerce” (McCune & Harrison, 1951, p. 37).

American Protestants also made their greatest inroads in Korea at the turn of the twentieth century (Davies, 1992, p. 809). James Kim (2004, p. 33) stated that “the majority of Protestant missionaries in Asia and Africa during the heyday of the Christian missionary movement from the 1860s to the 1920s relied on the political and military resources of Western powers.” American missions were conflated with business during the same time frame as Allen’s tenure in Korea (Wells, 1990, pp. 9 and 11). Whereas Dae Young Ryu alluded to Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis, Andrew Wells reversed the direction; that is, rational characteristics of capitalism “became characteristic of American Christianity.” Ellinwood (1876, p. 31) claimed that “bankers” would support missionaries up to “half a million dollars” and “many months in advance.” Accordingly, a U.S. naval officer stated in 1891 that missionaries appeared to have unlimited funds (LaFeber, 1963, p. 304). Walter LaFeber (1963, p. 57, emphasis mine) posited that U.S. politics “insisted on creating a Korean vacuum which could be filled at least partially with American commerce and missionaries.” The State Department also noted this correlation between commerce and missionaries (Palmer, 1963, pp. 194 and 205). Even Henry Appenzeller, one of the earliest Protestant missionaries in Korea had opined that Korea had to develop through “free enterprise capitalism” (Davies, 1992). The Independent claimed that “Christian Missionary work… has been the friend of commerce… and has done more to open the East than any other one factor” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, The Independent, August 18, 1896). In 1900, Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Ellinwood, December 17, 1900) told Ellinwood that “missionary success” was so prevalent among both the Americans and French that the Russians and Japanese wanted to bring their own priests to promote business: “People are always speaking of the missionary as the forerunner of commerce and civilization in its impact with the native customs, and ideas.” Various scholars have used the terms “manifest destiny” and “expansionism” concerning the U.S. and Korea and Asia from the mid-1800s through the early-1900s (e.g., Bailey, 1964, pp. 226 and 421; Merk, 1963, p. 24; Neill, 1990, p. 220).

It is in this expansionistic context that missionaries would play an important role in Korea. On the one hand, F. F. Ellinwood (1899, p. v) stated that “the success of missions in the highest sense must depend on the work of the Holy Ghost in renewing the hearts of men.” He believed that false religions had to be attacked as soon as possible (Ellinwood, 1896, p. vii). Ellinwood (1899, p. v) claimed that the Board of Foreign Missions, and hence its missionaries, were “emphatically Biblical and evangelical” in their work. Nonetheless, he (1899, p. vii, emphasis mine) conflated the Gospel with commerce:

*In God’s plan commerce often becomes the handmaid of the Gospel.* The development of agriculture and the opening of gold fields, new channels of communication, and even the
establishment of protectorates over savage and partially civilized nations – all these enter into the great movement by which the kingdom of God is advanced.

LaFeber (1963, p. 304) posited that “missionaries bragged of their commercial prowess” because they were the best form of advertisement to sell American products.

How were American missionaries able to make such a commercial impact in Korea? First, American missionaries appear to have been very self-selective as they were usually “educated beyond college” (Hutchinson, 1987, p. 1). Class created a selection bias that precluded those from “poor families” and favored those of the “middle-class” (Ryu, 2001, p. 95). American Missionaries transplanted their class lifestyles in Korea which then became a powerful form of advertisement; hence the reason for their “unlimited funds” (LaFeber, 1963, p. 304). Second, Ryu (2001, p. 103) claimed that “missionaries were the only Westerners during the period who began to reside in Korea’s interior permanently” and that “the Korean interior was one of those remote places where American merchandise would never have penetrated other than through the introduction and the creation of a demand for it by missionaries.” Easurk Charr (1996, p. 69), the only Korean immigrant to Hawaii (1903-1905) who wrote an autobiography in English, stated that after his encounter with missionaries Samuel A. Moffett and Dr. Wells that he longed to be able to dress like them. As late as 1923, *The Saturday Evening Post* (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, September 8, 1923) printed an article titled “How Missionaries Help Foreign Trade” which also noted America’s overproduction and thus the imperative of opening new markets. Missionaries became a means to fill a structural hole between Western producers and Korean consumers.

Between 1884 and 1910, over “two-thirds of the Protestant missionaries” who went to Korea were from America (Ryu, 2007, p. 373). However, some missionaries took advantage of their special privileges. Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Ellinwood, June 7, 1900) reported to Ellinwood that American businesses were complaining of missionaries who were engaged in personal trade. Allen felt that some missionaries were engaged in the “most flagrant and open violations of treaty stipulations” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to sons, July 21, 1900). He called these opportunistic missionaries “untrained, ungentlemanly, crackbrained fanatics” who did “incalculable harm” by abusing their “extraterritorial rights” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Frank Carpenter, August 23, 1900). Harrington (1980, p. 108) claimed that two missionaries, Graham Lee and Samuel A. Moffett, secured their Yalu timber concession by “using whatever influence they had” in order “to bring out lumber [trees] from that region.” Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Morgan, May 29, 1903) claimed that Lee and Moffett “declined to pay what they call an illegal tax” and he was thus caught in the middle to resolve this problem.

*The Independent* (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, August 11, 1898) praised American missionaries for their “great deal of good in the matter of the introduction of foreign goods and creating a demand for them,” but also rebuked those who had their “living assured and having no expenses” and were able to undersell Korean merchants. In 1898, Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Ellinwood, September 1898) sent a letter to Ellinwood because Walter D. Townsend was complaining about unfair competition from missionaries Vinton (“100 cheap sewing machines”)
and Underwood (“a cargo of kerosene, coal, etc.”). Missionaries who engaged in such activities were suspected of being profit-driven. The Independent (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, October 4, 1898) stated that if a missionary wanted “to be a merchant he has the right to do so,” but he had to be a merchant and not a “missionary.” Apparently, Underwood (paradoxically) made a public statement on this issue: “All should know that Christian work is not allowed to suffer by the giving of time to secular business” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Underwood to The Independent, August 22, 1898). Nonetheless, whether the Gospel was holistic or social, missionaries had a direct effect on consumption; missionaries were the most efficient means to create demand.

Several years prior to the 1882 Korean-American (Shufeldt) Treaty, Admiral Shufeldt (1878, p. 3, emphasis mine) stated: “At least one-third of our mechanical and agricultural products are now in excess of our own wants, and we must export these products or deport the people who are creating them. It is a question of starving millions.” David Pletcher (2001, p. 187) claimed that the 1882 Treaty “was an expression of economic expansionism.” Shufeldt (1878, p. 4) believed that the navy had a twofold purpose: in times of war it served as “commerce destroyers” and during times of peace it served as “commerce savers.” It was the latter which fueled his desire to secure a treaty with Korea. However, he was not against using a combination of force, diplomacy, and missionary endeavors. He claimed that “the American gun, under the American flag, is the most powerful ally to the American missionary” (Shufeldt, 1877, p. 6). According to Frederick Drake (1984, pp. 304 and 46), Shufeldt tried to open markets in Africa and Asia to establish America’s “commercial supremacy in the Pacific.” Apparently, opening foreign markets would be a priority for Secretary of State James Blaine in 1881. However, the over-production that Shufeldt mentioned in 1878 was not unique to the U.S. Frank Reich (2007, p. 17) claimed that as output “exploded” in the 1800s, there was a “severe depression” in Europe and America because “supply outran demand.” Allen believed that England faced “starvation and riot” if they could not continue exporting cotton goods to China and that a loss of trade would lead to “insurrection in the British Isles” (Allen, 1908, p. 254).

According to LaFeber (1963, p. 1), America’s expansionism shifted in 1861: first, the U.S. would try to increase its presence in “Hawaii, Latin America, Asia, and Africa,” and second, in some countries agricultural endeavors would be replaced with opening new markets. In 1899 and 1900, China, Korea, Japan, and Manchuria would receive the State Department’s “top priority” regarding “increased American trade, concession hunting, and missionary activity” (LaFeber, 1963, p. 1; Reich, 2007, p. 18) Allen received orders from W. W. Rockhill as late as 1903 which echoed Shufeldt’s (1878) sentiments: “I hope you will use your best efforts to induce the Koreans to open foreign trade” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Rockhill to Allen, July 25, 1903). Allen would utilize “his intimate relations with the Korean court to sell American interests along with the Lord’s” (LaFeber, 1963, p. 57). Although Allen (Burnett, 1989, p. 138) helped American missionaries before and after his resignation as a missionary (Presbyterian Church U.S.A.), his particular focus entailed expansionism. In 1897, Alexis de Speyer (the Russian Minister to Korea), could not distinguish Allen’s missionary and diplomatic roles in Korea. Allen claimed that de
Speyer detested Allen's expansionistic influences and "sneeringly" referred to Allen "as a Missionary" (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Everett, October 12, 1897). Perhaps some persons like Ellinwood had no problem if Allen was conflating missions and commerce. Other missionaries like Moffett and Underwood (paradoxically) did have a problem with this nexus and made formal protests (Moffett, 1975, pp. 16 and 18).

Though other missionaries also conflated missions and commerce, it was Allen who filled a structural hole between nation-states. It was Allen who would be known eventually as "a McKinley in Korea" because of his impetus on American expansionism (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, T. G. Thompson to Allen, June 8, 1905). Yet, of all of Allen's political "intermeddling," perhaps none violated U.S. law as much as the "franchise" of Korean immigration to Hawaii. And it is in Hawaii that the story of Allen, expansionism, and missionaries merge again. On the one hand, Korean emigration to Hawaii (1903-1905) was due to "the penetration of foreign capitalism" in both Korea and Hawaii (Pomerantz, 1984, p. 293; Chen & Bonacich, 1984, p. 293). However, Koreans also chose to make their own history. Under conditions of expansionism or missions, Allen would not have had the same efficacy regarding concessions, the development of Christianity, and the illegal transfer of Korean laborers to Hawaii. That is, particular contexts created a structural hole and as Allen increased his social capital via his position in a network, he fulfilled a unique role.

**Hawaii: Expansionism and Missions**

Initially, as in Korea, the U.S. official policy in Hawaii was one of "neutrality" and "American commercial expansion" (LaFeber, 1963, p. 111). The Hawaiian Islands were included in the U.S.' expansionistic discussions in the 1840s (Vevier, 1960, p. 92). These discussions evince patterns of U.S. "economic penetration" via treaties and commerce policies regarding Hawaii, Korea, China, and Japan (Dennett, 1941, p. 611). Aside from trade interests, the U.S. was also interested in Hawaii regarding naval bases (Strong, 1990, pp. 198-9; Nevins, 1966, p. 550; Moon, 1944, p. 402). In 1884, a treaty was signed between the U.S. and Hawaii to allocate Pearl Harbor solely for the U.S. Navy (Ferrell, 1969, p. 362). Hawaii was considered second in importance only to the Philippines as a naval base (Moon, 1944, p. 395).

Unlike Korea, U.S. officials such as Blaine would not allow another foreign power to gain control of the Hawaiian Islands (Index to the executive documents, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1881-1882, p. 638). During mid-1897, reports circulated in Korea that the U.S. would annex Hawaii under President McKinley's directives (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, The Independent, June 22, 24, and July 3, 1897). McKinley believed that annexing Hawaii was part of America's "Manifest Destiny" (LaFeber, 1963, p. 366). Interestingly, a conflation of missions and commerce in Hawaii evinces a "pattern" that was also replicated in Korea (Kim, 1977, p. 47). Prior to and or in conjunction with commercial growth, Hawaii was inundated with missionaries.
Ellinwood (1876, p. 39) wrote: “Perhaps in no place since the day of Pentecost has there been witnessed a more wonderful outpouring of the Holy Spirit than in the Sandwich Islands...between the years 1837 and 1843, the Sandwich Islands Churches increased in membership from 1,259 to 23,804.” He also wrote: “I speak advisedly when I claim the Hawaii of today as the manifest result of missionary labor and influence” (Ellinwood, 1899, p. 241). Chang and Patterson (2003, p. 2) claimed that American missionaries brought religion as well as “capitalism, Western learning, and Western culture” to Hawaii. From the mid- to late-nineteenth century, American Christians in Hawaii evinced a paternalistic “national destiny” (Mackenzie, 1961, p. 46). Allen became a connected with Hawaii in the context of expansionism and missions:

Asian immigration into Hawaii and the United States was but one aspect of a larger historical process that has sometimes been called the “expansion of Europe.” For several centuries, colonists, capitalists, soldiers, and missionaries from Europe roamed the earth in search of land, profits, power, and souls. When Americans joined this venture, they justified it as part of their manifest destiny (Chan, 1991, p. 23, emphasis mine).

Korean laborers were thought to be ideal for Hawaii’s plantations because they were viewed as cheap laborers who were satisfied with “low wages” (Griffis, 1912, p. 151).

**Missionary Influence on Korean Emigrants**

By the time that Koreans immigrated to Hawaii, Allen had stockpiled enough social capital to fill a structural hole; he became a node for the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Association (HSPA), Deshler, American missionaries, and officials in Hawaii, Korea, and America. Various missionaries (present and former) who were connected with Allen played a role in Korean emigration to Hawaii (Kwon, 2003, p. 96). For example, George H. Jones (a Methodist pastor and personal friend of Allen) influenced Koreans to go to Hawaii (Murabayashi, 2002, p. 5). He believed that Korean emigrants would not subtract from the mission work in Korea but would add to the larger missionary endeavors in Hawaii (Jones, 1905, p. 42). According to Murabayashi (2001, p. 7) when “recruiters of immigrants to Hawaii encountered difficulty in convincing Koreans, the Reverend Jones assured them of the pleasant weather, educational opportunity and higher wages, free housing, and medical care and encouraged church members to go to Hawaii.” Homer B. Hulbert, another friend of Allen and former missionary, used his influence as the publisher of the Korea Review to propagandize about Hawaii to prospective Korean plantation workers (Patterson, 1979, p. 152). Hulbert’s influence was important in rebutting claims that Koreans may have faced harsh challenges in Hawaii. Contrary to rumors that plantation life was easy, Hyun Soon (Hyun, H. My Autobiography, p. 63) stated: “Almost all of my fellow Koreans were discouraged to live in such a terrible camp and work so hard in the sugar cane field.”

In Korea, mission agencies in general and Presbyterians in particular were very organized and “cooperated” regarding geographic boundaries to avoid unnecessary competition (Underwood, 1980, p. 124). Missionary cooperation appears to have been employed in Hawaii too:
“In 1905, a fraternal agreement was made between the Hawaiian (Congregational) Board and the Methodists that the Methodists would be in charge of Japanese and Korean work and that the Congregationalists were to care for the Chinese and Hawaiians” (Lee, 2001, p. 7). However, if missionaries helped provide Korean labor, the sugar industry provided the capital. Kwon (2003, p. 96) claimed that “American missionaries bridged the gap between American businessmen and Korean workers.” Closing this gap became important as Hawaiian sugar production increased after the Reciprocity Treaty of 1876, from 9,400 tons in 1870 to 300,000 tons in 1900 (Takaki, 1994, p. 28).

The Hawaiian Labor and Supply Company was formed in 1882 (and became the HSPA in 1895). In February 1891, the State Department received notice that “a large number of influential native-born citizens of the Hawaiian Islands” had met and based on certain “resolutions,” they wished to express their “deepest gratitude” to “the United States Government” (The Executive Documents, 1891-1892, p. 14). Of the sixteen signees, the fourteenth was F. M. Swanzy, who wrote a letter to Leigh Hunt (on behalf of the HSPA) to get information regarding the possibility of recruiting Korean laborers (Patterson, 1988, p. 17). In 1901, The New York Times (“Hawaiians at the White House,” November 15, 1901) reported that various “citizens of Hawaii,” such as F. M. Swanzy, had a meeting at the White House with the President to discuss “the labor situation in the Hawaiian Islands” with respect to “the sugar plantations.” Patterson (1988, p. 3) claimed that “the sugar planters became the single most powerful economic group in Hawaii – a status that continued even after annexation to the United States in 1898, when contract labor became illegal.” The HSPA began to discuss the possibility of using Koreans to man their fields in 1896 (Patterson, 1979, pp. 3 and 23). However, if a Korean (usually male) wanted to become a worker in the Hawaiian sugar fields, he had to be “individually motivated” and finance his own travel costs (Gardner, 1970, p. 2; Chang and Patterson, 2003, p. 11). Providing prepaid transportation or similar assistance would have been illegal (Patterson, 1988, p. 12).

According to Yong-ho Ch’oe (2007, p. 21), about 7,400 Korean immigrants (men, women, and children) entered Hawaii between 1903 and 1905; 113 were “farmers” (owned their own land) and 6,172 were “farm laborers.” Korean laborers represented both a long-term goal (cheap labor) and a short-term goal (dilute the Japanese working population) (Ch’oe, 2007, pp. 14-15; Zihn, 2002, p. 44). Unsurprisingly, Allen stated that “the Koreans find ready employment” on the plantations (Burnett, 1989, p. 182). There is only one autobiography written in English by a Korean-Hawaiian emigrant who used Hawaii to reach the U.S. mainland. Easurk Charr (1996, p. 106) claimed that the HSPA “gave church buildings to each camp of each group or nationality for religious services, and even their preachers’ salaries were paid for by the plantation owners.”

The HSPA also distributed bilingual fliers in Korea to recruit workers (and interpreters) for their plantations (Yi, 2007, p. 42). Soon Hyun (My Autobiography, pp. 9 and 56) was born in Korea on March 21, 1879 and became a Christian in 1901. He became an interpreter on behalf of the HSPA and David Deshler. One of his children stated: “My father was among the first Koreans to acquire a Western education, studying not only its language but its religion – Christianity. Because
of his knowledge of English and his theological background, my father was hired by the East-West Development Company [Deshler] in 1903 to lead a group of Korean immigrants to Hawaii” (Hyun, 1995, p. 1, emphasis mine). Soon Hyun (Hyun, My Autobiography, pp. 9 and 56) was clearly aware of the HSPA’s need for labor and became an interpreter for the East-West Development Company by November 1902 and interacted with “Reverend George H. Jones… [who] advised his church members to join the emigrants to Hawaii.”

Why would Koreans be “individually motivated” to immigrate to Hawaii? As noted, when American missionaries first arrived (in Korea) Korea faced internal and external pressures. Allen claimed that he saw “three great decennial overturns” in battles over Korea: the Chinese conquered the Japanese in 1884; the Japanese conquered the Chinese in 1894; and the Japanese conquered the Russians in 1904 (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, A speech given at Clark University by Allen, 1909). Ryu (2008, p. 388) noted that some Koreans only “converted” to receive physical rather than spiritual benefits; these “converts” were also known as “rice Christians.” Accordingly, some immigrants left Korea to flee Japanese (anti-religious) encroachment (Takaki, 1990, p. 18). Some push factors were “poverty, instability, and oppression in Korea” and the pull factors were the purported good life to be found in Hawaii (Patterson, 1988, p. 113). Charr (1996, p. 105) recounts how his uncle shared of the splendors of Hawaii and how it was known as “The Paradise Island” – Charr really longed to go to Hawaii. In early 1904, Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to John B. Campbell, February 1, 1904) claimed that in Korea, “over one hundred people were frozen to death in their homes” because they could not afford to purchase fuel. Nancy Abelmann and John Lie (1995, p. 53) propose that the contexts of economic hardships in Korea, Christian missions in Korea, growing Japanese hegemony, and sugar plantation “ethnic politics” all were responsible for Korean emigration.

What role did Allen play regarding Korean immigration to Hawaii? Allen would fill a structural hole between Korean laborers and the HSPA in four ways: (1) he won the favor of the King and Korean government for Korean emigration; (2) he secured a labor recruiter (Deshler); (3) he asked the U.S. government for help; and, (4) he helped the HSPA bypass the contract labor laws (Patterson, 1988, pp. 23 and 38). Yong-ho Ch’oe (2007, p. 11) claimed that “it was not until the intervention of Horace N. Allen… on behalf of the Hawaii sugar industry that the Korean government finally gave its approval to Korean emigrations.” As Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Hay, December 10, 1902, emphasis mine) was well connected with the Korean King and government, he sent two crucial letters on the same day; one letter was sent to John Hay (Secretary of State) and another letter was sent to Sanford Dole (Governor of Hawaii):

...It would seem that if these [Korean] people actually go to our islands and make a report that will lead others to follow; and if the Korean Government allows them to go, they may help to solve the labor question in these islands. I am satisfied that the Korean Government is not engaged in assisting these people to emigrate by advancing them funds.

By October 9, 1902, Allen felt that the political pieces for Korean emigration were in place (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Fassett, October 9, 1902).
A final hurdle came from some American missionaries in Korea. In 1903, Allen wrote a letter to Moffett alleging that Moffett was discouraging Koreans to go to Hawaii (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Moffett, February 25, 1903). Moffett was concerned that Koreans were entering Hawaii illegally as contract laborers. (Patterson, 1988, p. 73). Walter Townsend appeared to have similar sentiments regarding the legal issues because he refused the HSPA’s request to spearhead their request to assist Korean emigrants (Patterson, 1988, p. 73). Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Moffett, February 25, 1903) claimed that Moffett was acting “from a lack of information on the subject” by believing that the Koreans were “contract laborers” and concluded his letter by stating: “I have made particular effort to see that the immigration laws of the United States especially the contract labor laws, are not violated, and as the movement is one that seems to be desired by our own people and most beneficial in every way for the Koreans, I ask you to withhold judgment until you are better informed” (emphasis mine). In a letter to Dr. Scranton, in response to any concerns that the Koreans were entering Hawaii illegally, Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Scranton, December 6, 1905) implied that “a few thousand” Koreans in Hawaii had made huge sacrifices to have immigrated legally. Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Fassett, February 7, 1903) claimed that Sanford B. Dole, Hawaii’s Governor, thanked him for his work on behalf of “the deep interest of the islands.”

It appears that negative social capital (an obligation) influenced Allen to select Deshler as a labor recruiter. That Allen would help Deshler is not unusual considering Deshler’s involvement for Allen to become the U.S. Minister to Korea. Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Geo. P. Morgan, May 16, 1905) called Deshler “one of the best and truest friends I have.” Thus, by giving the Hawaiian emigration “concession” to Deshler, Allen could repay Deshler (and Nash) for the Minister position (Patterson, 1988, p. 30). When McKinley took office in 1897, Allen also received his new position and credited this promotion to Deshler’s stepfather (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Morse, September 10, 1896). Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, “Papers relating to Foreign Commercial Concessions in Korea,” n.d.) wrote: “Dr. Allen was promoted to be Minister in 1897 at the request of the late Governor Nash of Ohio, whose step-son, D. W. Deshler, was in business in Korea.” In January 1897, Deshler’s father-in-law wrote to Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, George Nash to Allen, January 30, 1897): “I hope you will keep a friendly eye on my boy.” Allen clearly sensed that he owed Deshler an “obligation.” Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Nash, July 16, 1897) told Nash that “I will try not to disgrace you and to do all in my power to promote the interests of your son and Americans generally in Korea.” Allen further promised to be “to him as nearly like a brother” and to keep all of Nash’s wishes for his son-in-law. Several years before Koreans went to Hawaii, Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Collbran, September 7, 1898) sent a letter to his friend Collbran expressing his desires “to do something to please Deshler.” When the King allowed the “emigration franchise” to form in 1902, Allen was able to repay Deshler (and Nash).

Allen introduced Deshler to the Emperor (formerly King) Kojong as the “Territorial Bureau of Immigration” official, which was a non-existent position (Patterson, 1979, p. 144). Allen (Allen,
H. N., 1883-1923, *Korean Tales*, p. 8) wrote in 1889 that “banks proper do not exist” in Korea and that “a number of large brokers at the capital assist in the government financial transactions.” Coincidentally, the HSPA would become the sole depositor to Deshler’s bank to provide (illegal) “loans” to the Korean “immigrants” (plantation laborers) (Patterson, 1988, p. 100). According to Lee Houchins and Chang-Su Houchins (1976, p. 131): “Deshler had interests in a steamship company… and, therefore, stood to profit from transporting emigrants as well as from the fee paid by the HSPA for each Korean laborer to reach its plantations in Hawaii.” Shortly after a group of Koreans had gone to Hawaii, Deshler wrote to Allen: “I am anxious to open offices at Kunsan, Gensan and Chinnampo as soon as I can get away and thus get to work away from Chemulpo as I think we are too near the capital for our own good” (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Deshler to Allen, February 6, 1903). Apparently, Deshler also knew that the immigration concession was illegal. In 1904, Allen (Allen, H. N., 1883-1923, Allen to Nash, May 4, 1904) sent a letter to Nash that clearly showed how Allen was involved in assisting Deshler:

> His business is very prosperous. It seemed at first as though he might be sailing very close to the wind in his immigration matters, but I had letters from the governor of Hawaii and indirect assurances from Washington and finally the matter was put on a proper basis by a hearing before the courts, followed by an official invitation from the Hawaiian Authorities to the Koreans so that Dave was placed in the proper light.

**Summary and Conclusion**

I have tried to show that Horace Allen’s tenure in Korea was shaped by a particular set of contexts. As America began a new wave of Manifest Destiny, Korea was ready to break its ties with China. On the one hand, Western missionaries had a zealous fervor to propagate their faith throughout the world in general, and with respect to this study, Korea in particular. On the other hand, Western nations were also involved in commercial expansionism to open foreign markets. It was this conflation of missions and expansionism that paved a way for Allen to enter Korea. Allen would subsequently fill a structural hole and become a node regarding missionary and U.S. commercial activities in Korea. Under conditions of expansionism or missions, Allen would not have had the same efficacy regarding concessions and the development of Christianity.

Further, America’s missionary and expansionistic involvement in Korea had some parallels regarding Hawaii. America would follow a policy of “neutrality” as long as its commerce was safe. However, at the turn of the twentieth century, the U.S. had more commercial and military interests in Hawaii than in Korea. As Hawaii transformed into a major agrarian producer (sugar), which was facilitated by U.S. laws and consumer demands, labor became an issue. Allen once again filled a structural hole as he connected actors regarding the illegal immigration of about seven thousand Koreans. This was possible because he had stockpiled enough social capital regarding various actors and nation-states (the U.S., Korea, and Hawaii).
This paper makes an important contribution because, to my knowledge, no study has perused the entire Allen MSS and woven a single theme that connects Allen’s “intermeddling” in both Korea and Hawaii. In fact, only Patterson and Harrington seem to have read the Allen MSS in its entirety. Yet they bifurcate Allen’s involvement in Korea (Harrington) and his “intermeddling” in Hawaii (Patterson). Further, they do not place Allen in a larger context of missions and commerce. However, despite my perusal of the Allen MSS and other primary sources regarding Allen, some questions remain. Why did Allen become a missionary? What happened to his wife (and two sons)? Did he have a personal worldview (theology) regarding his actions as a missionary and diplomat? Aside from telling his sons that he was a “heathen,”” did not care to offend a “fickle god” regarding potential profits, and that the U.S was in “sin” by allowing Japan to overtake Korea, I could not find much concerning Allen’s “theology” in the MSS. Although I believe that this paper provides an important contribution regarding Allen’s involvement in Korea, disentangling “missions” from the political and commercial components becomes enigmatic with respect to Allen. If demarcating a social gospel from a holistic gospel is problematic (today), this is very difficult regarding Allen. He was a product of his time as even Ellinwood and other missionaries promoted (conflated) missions and commerce.

Further, since Allen most likely minimized the amount of incriminating evidence he sent to the New York Public Library (and State Department), this study would have been enhanced by incorporating the HSPA papers. These papers span the period 1882-1959 and are located at the University of Hawaii Library. Manuscripts that encompass the correspondence of F. M. Swanzy, William G. Irwin, Walter M. Giffard, David Deshler, and other persons with respect to the HSPA would have provided more information regarding Allen’s (or other missionary) intermeddling. Thus far, most of the literature regarding Allen has uncritically overly-emphasized the religious components (spiritual- and functional-oriented) or his financial and political endeavors (i.e., Harrington and Patterson’s conflict-oriented works).

Although I incorporated two major works by Soon Hyun in this paper, there are over seven hundred items of Soon Hyun in the USC Digital Archives. Granted, many of the items are pictures, but there are other documents that I did not explore. Also, there are many other State Department records in the University of Wisconsin Digital Archives that include official correspondence (1861-1960) concerning China, Japan, the Philippines, and South American nations as America pressed forward in her expansionistic policies; how does this study compare to expansionistic and missionary endeavors in these countries? Finally, can social network theory (perhaps fractal geometry, cell automata, and or chaos) enrich a socio-historic analysis of structural holes and social capital regarding Allen’s involvement in Korea and Hawaii?

Despite these delimitations, the story of Allen, Korea, and Hawaii evinces a type of “Manifest Destiny” on multiple levels and provides an important account regarding the intersection of missions, expansionism, structural holes, and social capital. Perhaps Allen evinces a side of American missions that may not have been pleasant to some readers. Yet, presenting Allen (missions) only in a positive light contributes to paternalism. A fuller account without either
The extreme of emphasizing only religious or social forces provides a more liberating picture. Either position in its extremity becomes myopic. Finally, Allen was not a single actor but operated within the contexts of America’s missions and expansionism. I hope this socio-historic analysis encourages other scholars to revisit and rethink missions in general and Protestant developments in Korea in particular.

Works Cited


Hyun, S. (n.d.). My autobiography, chapters 1 to 6, the Reverend Soon Hyun collected works, University of Southern California Libraries.


Notes

i According to Wayne Patterson (1988, pp. 27-8): “William K. Deshler died in 1880 and his widow married two years later to George Kilborn Nash. George Nash was a prominent Ohio politician. He had been appointed to the Ohio Supreme Court by then Governor Charles Foster. At that time Nash belonged to the Sherman-Hanna-McKinley wing of the Republican Party which was at odds with the Joseph Foraker faction. When David Deshler returned to Korea in September 1896, he had already convinced his stepfather to lead the fight to secure the post of minister for Allen. At this point Nash took over the campaign to secure Allen’s appointment as American minister to Korea. In January 1897, Nash wrote to President-elect William McKinley (who was from Canton, Ohio) suggesting Allen’s appointment because of his fitness for the office and ‘as a great personal favor to myself.’”

ii Sarah Vowell (2011, p. 6) makes a link between “Christianity” and “capitalism” but not between Hawaii and Korea. Patterson (1988, p. 1) makes a connection between Hawaii and Korea regarding labor needs and labor power, but not regarding Christianity and commerce in both Korea and Hawaii.

iii The Korean-American Treaty and Chinese Exclusion Act were also enacted in 1882.

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